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Much of the contemporary debate in the West surrounding Mao Zedong, his life, his 
actions, and his writings have centered on the atrocities committed during the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution.  While these atrocities were undoubtedly terrible, the 
intentions behind them often go overlooked.  Indeed, many tend to accept the narrative that Mao, 
the undisputed leader of the People’s Republic, purposefully, knowingly, and heartlessly allowed 
millions to die and face persecution during these periods, drawing frequent comparisons to the 
likes of Adolf Hitler.   These comparisons often ignore the fact, however, that Hitler committed 1
his atrocities in the context of a racist attitude toward the Jewish people with the intention of 
wiping them off the planet.  In Mao’s case, similarly evil undertones do not appear to exist.  The 
most that can be said of Mao is he persecuted his political enemies, and certainly in cases such as 
Liu Shaoqi this appears to be true.  If his only goal were to purge enemies to maintain his own 
power, however, it is difficult to believe he would use such public tactics; indeed, public purges 
such as the ones Mao used are not politically popular.  A more logical conclusion seems to be 
that throughout his life, Mao sought out the most pragmatic outcomes — namely, ones that 
would most benefit China — but after gaining power he did not know how to govern a nation 
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full of people with different ideas which might be in conflict with his own.  This lack of 
knowledge, coupled with a misplaced faith in certain practices, led Mao to commit these terrible 
atrocities, despite the best of intentions.  To be clear, this does not absolve Mao of these sins — 
indeed, he should have been self-aware enough to recognize the harm he was causing sooner and 
put an end to it — but I believe this assessment gives Mao the humanity he deserves, rather than 
stripping him of his humanity and portraying him as a monster with no moral compass 
whatsoever. 
 First it is important to examine Mao’s early life, which had a profound influence on him. 
Mao lived a fairly comfortable life for someone from the countryside, but he was certainly not 
sheltered from the struggles of those around him.  He saw peasants struggling for food during a 
great famine in his youth, and saw the government, landlords, and merchants completely ignore 
them.   Certainly, there is the chance that accounts such as Edgar Snow’s are slightly biased in 2
Mao’s favor, but at the same time there is little incentive for Mao to lie about what he witnessed 
as a child, and given the fact that he witnessed such hunger and pain, it is hard to believe that he 
did not sympathize with those people.  Indeed, these experiences seem to support the idea that 
Mao really cared about peasants in the countryside and those at the lowest levels Chinese society. 
This is further supported by the extent to which he was required to do heavy labor, even as a 
rather young man at the age of thirteen.  Perhaps most important during this period, however, 3
was his willingness even as a young man to disavow his own principles for the most pragmatic 
outcomes.  In spite of Mao’s distaste for the Classics, for example, he “quoted, in exchange, 
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passages from the Classics saying that the elder must be kind and affectionate [in response to 
accusations of being unfilial]”   Even here, Mao is searching for the most pragmatic outcomes - 4
namely, the ones that would lead to the best outcomes for everyone involved, even if it meant 
violating his principles.  These are not the signs of a heartless, immoral creature being bred in 
Hunan, but rather the signs of a pragmatic idealist. 
 Even later in his life, especially in many of his early writings, we do not see any signs of 
Mao possessing an agenda against a certain group of people, but rather a desire to achieve good 
outcomes.  As early as 1937, we see Mao railing against dogmatic ideas in general and the idea 
that contradiction is somehow inherently bad: 
“If, through study, we achieve a real understanding of the essentials explained 
above, we shall be able to demolish dogmatist ideas which are contrary to the 
basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and detrimental to our revolutionary cause, 
and our comrades with practical experience will be able to organize their 
experience into principles and avoid repeating empiricist errors.”  5
Again, this is not the sign of a man who is going to purge his opponents later in life solely for the 
purpose of maintaining his own power.  This is the sign of a man who wants China to succeed, 
and is not afraid to go against his own Marxist/Maoist principles in order to achieve that success. 
In fact, this sort of advocacy encourages people to turn against him and overthrow him if they 
feel he is taking them in the wrong direction, because according to his own teachings, 
dogmatically following him is a bad thing.  Someone only interested in his own power would not 
do this - he would encourage those around him to accept dogmatic principles, telling people to 
follow him.  Of course, during his years in Yanan, Mao does begin some purges and orders many 
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self-criticisms, and these are undoubtedly things that, on the surface at least, seem indicative of 
someone looking to hold onto power.   On the contrary, however, I believe this is an effort on the 6
part of Mao to maintain some sense of unity in the face of foes both at home and abroad, the 
KMT and the Japanese.  At this point, the CCP was small and fractured, and couldn’t afford to 
have much in the way of dissent.  Even if these small purges seemed harsh, they were important 
in the face of these dangers, and ultimately they served a pragmatic purpose, particularly in the 
context of revolution where a lack of unity could lead to death.   
These purges were also quite effective because in the context of the Party, members 
consent into following Mao and are expected to do so, which means people respond well to these 
incentives and proclamations from him.  In the context of a nation-state, this doesn’t work 
because those you are responsible for don’t necessarily consent to your rule, and this is likely 
why Mao failed as a national leader despite his success as a revolutionary.  As such, rushing to 
the conclusion that Mao simply wanted power seems misguided, or at the very least overly 
cynical from a purely academic perspective.  However, given his willingness to accept 
contradictions and reject dogma at other times, ideas which would contribute to a reduction in his 
power, it is unlikely he simply wanted to maintain power. 
 From the start, during his time in Yanan, Mao recognized the importance of learning 
through practice, not through dogma, as he advocated “Discover[ing] the truth through practice, 
and again through practice verify[ing] and develop[ing] the truth”.   While some might claim that 7
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Mao simply wanted to instill fear in the hearts of his people, that seems unlikely given the fact 
that he wanted his people to try things on their own to discover the truth.  Again, a man who 
simply wants to instill fear would advocate simple dogma and then persecute those who do not 
follow.  We also see this openness to criticism on the part of Mao in the case of the Hundred 
Flowers Campaign.  While that did not last long, it still appears clear that Mao supports openness 
and criticisms in instances where it would be pragmatically beneficial, and supports dogma in 
instances where that is pragmatically beneficial.  That is hardly the policy of an autocrat who 
simply wants everyone to listen to him to keep power to himself, who would probably never be 
okay with any sort of free-thinking - indeed, the intentions of his actions need to be taken into 
account, and his intentions here seem noble.  Even in private, Mao seemed to recognize the 
pragmatic importance of having a slightly more open society: 
“In private, Mao was more forthright.  The critics had got it wrong, he told a 
conference of senior party officials later that month.  There was not too much 
freedom, but too little.  Writings hostile to Marxism, such as the works of Chiang 
Kai-shek, should be published openly in China, because ‘if you haven’t read 
anything written [by him], you won’t be able to do a good job opposing him.”  8
Given his willingness to support a more open society even in private, it appears clear that Mao 
was being honest in his support for this liberalization.  Perhaps he later thought it went too far, 
and given the extent to which China became divided and divisive as a result, he was probably 
correct to have this concern.    9
Indeed, in the mid-1950s, China was in a precarious position. This was only a few years 
after the CCP took over, and the country still had deep divisions and resentments from the 
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decades previous.  It seems as if Mao wanted the sort of constructive criticism that might move 
the country forward, but he recognized that given the context , it was not a good idea to allow 10
such ideas to flourish.  Perhaps this was harsh and undemocratic, and indeed it probably was, but 
that does not mean Mao was a heartless autocrat.  The motivation here seems to be a desire to 
maintain some sort of stability in China. It is easy to claim that he used the Hundred Flowers 
Campaign to bring dissenters to the surface, but someone as desperate for power as many claim 
Mao was would not allow that criticism to come to light at all.  While the tactics he used in the 
aftermath of the Hundred Flowers Campaign were almost certainly a bit harsh, his intentions 
were not that sadistic, and as such it is still far less problematic than most contemporary 
commentators like to claim. 
 With that in mind, one must ask: why did Mao choose to use such harsh, unpopular 
tactics in an effort to maintain stability and enforce unity?  Why not quietly silence some people 
while putting out massive amounts of propaganda?  The answer seems to be that Mao did not 
know how to run a nation well.  Indeed, the tactics he used were more acceptable in Yenan, 
where everyone consented to his authority and were happy to listen to him.  This is not true when 
it comes to China as a whole, however, where there are far more divergent opinions and 
ideologies at play.  In this context, those obedient to him were not nearly as willing to simply 
accept what he said, as he discovered in the Hundred Flowers Campaign.   Based on the 11
evidence, though, it appears as if Mao truly believed opening things up would help the CCP and 
China as a whole move forward effectively, as he seemed to believe criticism was important - 
 That is, less than 10 years after the CCP took over and in a time where China was ideologically divided.10
 Xiaoping Deng, "On the Communist Party and the Young Communist League," 1957, in The Search for Modern 11
China: A Documentary Collection, ed. Janet Chen, et al., 3rd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2014), 
408.
and he appeared prepared to accept criticisms of himself personally.  He didn’t pull back on the 
Hundred Flowers Campaign until the very foundation of Chinese stability was threatened; 
namely, when people called for an end to CCP rule and took to the streets in a sometimes violent 
fashion.   While he fell back on harsh tactics, it does not appear as if he was simply an autocrat; 12
he also had some far more benevolent motivations. 
 These other motivations become even clearer in the case of Mao’s handling of the Great 
Leap Forward.  Indeed, this is the event for which Mao tends to draw the most criticism, as it 
probably led to the most deaths during his time in charge.   Many of Mao’s critics, especially 13
historians such as Jasper Becker, criticize Mao for the failed efforts to duplicate the sort of 
industrialization that occurred in places like the USSR under Stalin.   Indeed, given the 14
devastation these practices caused, it is very easy to cast blame and criticism on Mao for what 
happened during this period.  That being said, given the extent to which industrialization was 
pervading the world at this point, it’s hard to blame Mao for a desire to industrialize.  Indeed, a 
purely agricultural economy likely could not have thrived in the latter part of the 20th century. 
Moreover, it is important to note that Mao did not have many resources to utilize when it came to 
rapid industrialization.  The Soviet policies when it came to industrialization were the only 
resources he really had at this point, and while he wanted to adopt them to fit China’s situation, 
as a starting point he did not really have anywhere else to turn.   Of course, it didn’t help that 15
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just a few years into this process, all of his Soviet advisers picked up their things and left the 
country, with nowhere to turn.   This is not to say that Mao was competent in his handling of 16
this program; indeed, the extent to which he insisted on continuing the policies he implemented 
certainly caused much suffering , and that much is hard to deny. Firstly, however, it is hard to 17
blame him given the fact that he had no experience when it comes to industrialization, and the 
departure of his Soviet advisers likely did have a catastrophic impact as a result.  Moreover, he 
did end this program by 1961, which seems to show some concern on his part for preventing 
human suffering.   
Perhaps Mao made the choice to end the Great Leap Forward too late, and indeed it is 
impossible to deny he did, but at the same time it was probably reasonable for him to think that 
some sort of suffering was necessary in order to achieve pragmatic outcomes, and he certainly 
seemed to believe so: 
“In the past during the revolution numerous people died without asking anything 
in return.  Why can’t it be like that now?  If we can eat without paying for it, this 
would be a tremendous change.  Probably in about ten years our production will 
be very bountiful and the people’s morality will be very noble: then we can 
practice communism in eating, clothing, and housing.”  18
A nation trying to move quickly from an agrarian economy to an industrial one is likely to 
endure some hardships, and Mao’s decision to stay the course, while in retrospect foolish, at the 
time was at the very least reasonable.  Again, this seems to be an instance in which Mao wanted 
to achieve pragmatic outcomes - and industrializing quickly would have been a great outcome - 
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but simply did not know how to implement such policies effectively.  While one can certainly 
make the case that such a prioritization of pragmatics over life is immoral on its own, two things 
are worth noting: 1. The case for utilitarianism is at least a fair case to make, and doesn’t make 
Mao immoral on its own, and 2. Had Mao been successful, he likely could have saved far more 
lives in the long run , which is probably better even from a rights-based moral framework. 19
Philosophical arguments aside, the gist of this point is that Mao’s desire to industrialize quickly 
was reasonable, and that his willingness to sacrifice some lives in the short run was equally 
reasonable.  While Mao may have made a mistake in waiting so long to end the Great Leap 
Forward, and while that failure likely does make him culpable for literally millions of deaths in 
China during that period, it does not put him even in the same ballpark as men like Hitler, who 
consciously and purposefully killed millions for no purpose other than pure racism. 
 Of course, Mao’s greatest sin during his time in power was probably the Cultural 
Revolution and its associated purges, self-criticisms, etc.  Indeed, this was a low point in China’s 
history where Mao often used the Cultural Revolution to secure his own power in the People’s 
Republic.  While that claim is somewhat debatable, it becomes extremely clear from the 
documents we have from the period, where the Party advocates “Mao Zedong Thought” above 
all else: 
“In the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, it is imperative to hold aloft the 
great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought and put proletarian politics in 
command.  The movement for the creative study and application of Chairman 
Mao Zedong's works should be carried forward among the masses of the workers, 
peasants and soldiers, the cadres and the intellectuals, and Mao Zedong Thought 
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should be taken as the guide to action in the Cultural Revolution.”  20
Indeed, this is a clear indication that one of Mao’s primary goals here was to solidify his own 
power in the PRC structure.  The problem, however, is this does not necessarily make Mao a 
terrible, despotic ruler.  For one, it is worth noting that most leaders have some desire for power, 
and as such is not enough to demonstrate why Mao was uniquely bad.  More importantly, 
however, it is reasonable to conclude here that Mao also had some very pragmatic, and useful, 
aims.  Indeed, during this period, China was splintered and its leadership had a hard time taking a 
coherent position, especially with much of the infighting, which can be found throughout Li 
Zhisui’s book The Private Life of Chairman Mao.   What does this mean from a pragmatic 21
perspective for governing a state?  For one, it is important for a one-party state to have a clear, 
coherent position on issues in order for the state to remain stable.  When there are large 
disagreements among the party leadership, not only does that look bad for the state, but it also 
encourages a certain discontent that one-party states are not well-equipped to handle.   
At best this is a solid criticism of the Chinese one-party state system as a whole, but at 
the very least it makes Mao’s desire to purge those who disagree with him somewhat reasonable. 
More importantly, though, Mao was not an experienced head of state.  In the context of a 
revolutionary Party, it is definitely important to have a coherent stance on issues, as the opponent 
can easily exploit contradictions in that stance.  If Mao was not an experienced head of state, he 
was certainly an experienced revolutionary, and probably felt compelled to fall back on those 
tactics to maintain a coherent position - and in the process maintain stability - in China.  Perhaps 
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these tactics were unfair, harsh, and cruel.  Indeed, they almost certainly were.  But to say that 
Mao was simply a despotic ruler with no motivations other than his desire to maintain power is, 
put simply, unfair.  Mao even seems very aware of the necessity of maintaining order by ensuring 
the Party has a coherent position on the issues: “‘Every day I read documents and other materials 
with great interest,’ Mao wrote to her from our retreat in Wuhan. ‘Great chaos will lead to great 
order. The cycle appears every seven or eight years. The demons and monsters will come out by 
themselves. Their class character dictates it.’”   Indeed, Mao seems concerned here that the 22
different opinions from rightists appearing “every seven or eight years” leads to great chaos, and 
thus it is important to ensure that order emerges from it by using that chaos to identify the 
rightists.  Mao is very aware of the chaos that results when leaders of the Party start to espouse 
different positions.  This seems to be a very reasonable pragmatic reason for the Cultural 
Revolution, at least in some capacity.  Did Mao lose control of the Cultural Revolution?  Maybe. 
Did he know how to maintain order and a coherent position in the context of a nation-state, and 
not a revolutionary Party?  Certainly not, and these failures definitely led to some tragic 
consequences.  However, it is still not at all clear that Mao’s motivations here were solely to 
terrorize the people to maintain power.  Plus, it is important to remember that if this were his 
only goal, it is unclear why we would see things such as the Hundred Flowers Campaign.  If 
Mao’s only goal was to terrorize dissenters, why not implement the Cultural Revolution much 
earlier?  Given the fact that he did not, it seems much more plausible that he did so for the 
pragmatic reason of maintaining order in China in a time where order was not at all easy to come 
by. 
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The extent to which Mao Zedong, his policies, and his ideology have been politicized by 
those both in support and against him makes it very difficult to draw conclusions about his 
intentions and motivations during his time as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. 
Nonetheless, despite many of the contradictions, inconsistencies, and seemingly heartless actions 
taken by Mao, it seems unfair to make the blanket assertion that he was an immoral tyrant hell-
bent on maintaining power, caring about nothing else in his crusade against all enemies at home. 
Indeed, given the extent to which Mao throughout his life valued pragmatic outcomes and 
welcomed contradictions if it meant achieving those pragmatic outcomes, and given the 
pragmatic reasons for taking the actions he did (even in the case of atrocities such as the Great 
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution), Mao seems like more of a lost pragmatist than a 
brutal tyrant.  To be sure, Mao used some brutal tactics which may not have been necessary, but 
this seems more a result of his lack of ability to run a state rather than a result of his immorality. 
Did Mao make some bad choices in an effort to get the pragmatic outcomes he desired? 
Absolutely, and he deserves plenty of blame for that.  But painting him as someone as bad as 
Hitler, who mercilessly and needlessly exterminated millions, is unjustified.  Even if Mao 
wanted to maintain power, all leaders have that desire.  Mao also wanted what was best for China 
from an economic and political perspective, though, and even if he made bad choices to achieve 
those goals, and even if he used some unfortunate tactics to achieve them, they still set him apart 
from others.  While Mao will forever remain a controversial figure, exaggerations and ad 
hominem attacks do not advance that discourse, and it is my hope that moving forward, 
commentators will be more willing to examine these events with a level head. 
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